FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL SECURITY DOCTRINES

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Introduction

National security doctrines thrived under the post-war climate. The end of World War II and the subsequent cold war defined a world situation which can be labeled as "scatologic". Within this framework, relations between the military-economic superpowers become increasingly tense, since the fear of a new confrontation which could lead the so-called developed world to a new world war bordering total destruction, turns into a very real possibility 1/.

Therefore, the states directly involved in bipolar confrontation come to define national defense in terms of their own survival. The threats each of them would eventually confront are seen as endangering the basic values on which they have, until then, based existence itself 2/.

Within such an international climate, concepts required for understanding this new reality should not only allow for its analysis, but also must provide an adequate guide for action. Consequently, national security doctrines which develop at the time have a twofold character: on the one hand, they are the framework for analyzing the new post-war international scene; on the other, they are a guide for designing military and international policies of the states involved.

National security doctrines differ both according to the country in which they are developed as well as with the different possible "dangers" which can be identified within the increasingly dynamic international system.

The expansion of international relations to a world system in the middle of the 60's meant that practically no country was left out from the world market. Relations between states grew in complexity, not only because of the sheer increase in the number of ties developed, but as well due to the expansion of

*/ Contribución al Anuario de la UNESCO sobre problemas de la paz y las doctrinas militares.
the areas in which links were established 3/. For such reasons, along with détente which comes to existence as a product of this international scene, national security doctrines evolved along new lines, identifying a new type of danger. Even what was originally considered the basic danger for the state's survival comes to be seen in a different light.

This new conception expresses itself at a conceptual level by incorporating —along with geopolitical elements characteristic of its initial development 4/- new and predominant analytical tools coming from Political Science and military strategy. Such change is reinforced by the necessary adequation of national defense goals to the new situation. Such aims, which once dealt exclusively with defense of the state's sovereign territory, with growing state interdependence and multidimensionalization of interstate relations, change their very nature. Now, it is not only necessary to preserve a territory —which may have lost strategic value for the potential opponent— but it is necessary to defend a set of relations, which is not any more a geographic entity, and on which all states depend —one way or the other—for their own survival.

This evolution of national security doctrines makes space for improving relations between the superpowers. Nevertheless, it also provides the armed forces with an important role in the field of foreign relations. The progressive multidimensionalization of international relations fosters the progressive political role of the armed forces. As the international system grows in complexity, the probability of visualizing "threats" to national security correspondingly increases. At the same time, the means for confronting such dangers also increase and the tactics and strategies for making use of them are diversified. As an outcome, the armed forces scope of issues which come under the subject of "national security" widens.

Military involvement in what used to be civilian affairs implies the dissemination of a "Hobbesian" approach to international relations. The military bias sees war as an inevitable and atavistic mechanism, necessary for preserving an overall equilibrium, and as unavoidable as any other public calamity. Therefore, growth both of the armed forces presence and of its realm of influence over national security matters leads,
necessarily, to visualize the actual use of armed force as an always available means for resolving international conflicts.

Hence, though at present national security doctrines may have lost their scatological character, the preservation of this particular way of defining and confronting international disputes does not help resolve problems between states in a stable, lasting and peaceful way. On the contrary, its effect is to spread a standpoint which obviously hinders the process of arms limitation and disarmament.

The evolution of national security doctrines in the United States, the Soviet Union and in Latin America is proof of such an assertion, as we shall presently see.

U.S. National Security Doctrine

U.S. economic and political expansion at a world wide level at the end of World War II, and particularly after the Korean War, fostered an accelerated development of military conceptions on international relations. It not only had to provide understanding of the particular moment which the country lived, but also should be able of determing both where the country's security laid and how it could be ensured.

Such a conceptual development expresses itself by placing at the core of international relations the issue of the acquisition and use of power, trend of thought which has as its main exponents authors such as Niebhur, Kennan, Osgood and Morgenthau. Those authors project the newly defined U.S. interests far beyond what had ever been foreseen before at a theoretical level. Thus, they develop a doctrine, or practical guide for action, which unifies and guides international affairs. This school

"...was a violent reaction to American political idealism, represented by W. Wilson and F.D. Roosevelt, against the hollow ideas of universal peace, of disarmament, against all that is illusion, dream, utopia or lack of realism in politics. It accuses such idealism for its total lack of sense of real politics and, therefore, it accuses it of opening the road, by its ignorance or naiveness, to cynical adventurers such as Hitler or the Japanese generals.
It places opposite to pacifist idealism of dreamers a crude vision of the real interstate system. But it does so in such a radical way that in turn, it justifies the politics of force and of raison d'etat ... 6/.

For this school of "political realism" the achievement of the goals of a specific nation will basically depend on the national power it is capable of developing. In doing so, the Armed Forces are a fundamental element.

"What gives the factors of geography, natural resources, and industrial capacity their actual importance for the power of a nation is military preparedness. The dependence of national power upon military preparedness is too obvious to need much elaboration. Military preparedness requires a military establishment capable of supporting the foreign policies pursued. Such ability derives from a number of factors of which the most significant, from the point of view of our discussion, are technological innovations, leadership, and the quantity and quality of the armed forces" 7/.

Backed ideologically by this theoretical body, U.S. expansion at a world level emphasized military action in confronting the threats arising against its security. Thus the politics of containment (1945-1953), of massive retaliation (1954-1960), of flexible response (1961-1972) and the actual realistic deterrence, 8/ have been different versions of the evolution of U.S. national security doctrine itself. Such shifts both in the doctrine as in the means of ensuring security, show the variable character of the dangers perceived by the U.S. military. By focusing on them, it is possible to identify the goals and values which U.S. national security tends to protect 9/.

It is possible to distinguish two basic phases in the development of U.S. military national security doctrine, which correspond to two different stages in the international system complexification process. During the first phase, (1945-1960), the U.S. identified the Soviet Union as its main and most dangerous threat. In order to confront such a situation—which supposedly attempted against its own survival—national security
doctrine concentrated on containment of such a danger, in all fronts and sites around the world, and is a proportional answer to the way the risk itself is defined. Later on, with the heightening of the cold war, this doctrine adopts a formulation in terms of massive retaliation in case of imminent danger or declared attack.

According to such a definition of the international situation, national security within this period deals basically with the issue of preserving the state and the nation's existence and, consequently, with the total destruction of the potential aggressor. At an operational level, such doctrine expresses itself through regional security agreements which the U.S. advocates around the world (The South East Treaty Organization, the Interamerican Reciprocal Assistance Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization); the multiplication of military bases abroad; and the development of nuclear power, which the Soviet Union could not match.

A second phase in the development of U.S. national doctrine starts off in 1961, when a flexible response policy is first implemented. According to it, the U.S.

"...shall be committed only to a system that gives us the ability to use our forces in a controlled and deliberate way, so as best to pursue the interests of the U.S., our Allies, and the rest of the Free World."

This shift in U.S. strategy modified national security goals themselves and altered the ways in which they could be ensured. Such a change had already been favored by the armed forces, in their analysis of new goals which national security policy consider at the time:

"Until the end of World War II, U.S. military strategic thought was relatively simple. It followed along three rules. 1. Avoiding war, if possible; 2. In case of war, keeping the combat zone outside U.S. borders; 3. Once involved in war, destroying the enemy's armed forces as fast as possible. (...) The attainment of nuclear power—and its use within a new weapons system—revealed some
consequences which have made necessary seriously recon-
considering strategic thought. The armed forces still are
an important instrument of national foreign policy but,
today, the danger inherent to their use has made world
powers frequently make use of other means of reaching
its national goals. These means include the use of
political or diplomatic pressure; economic measures,
such as loans, licenses, most-favored country trade
agreements and technical cooperation; and psychological
methods including propaganda, threat of good will gestures
and, some times, internal policies aimed at impressing
other countries" 12/.

While the increase of Soviet nuclear power did force the
U.S. to détente in international affairs, U.S. economic expansion
after the Korean War multiplied its own system
of international relations. This new situation obliged the U.S.
to preservation of the world system itself, if it was not to
perish along with obtaining the enemy's destruction.

Consequently, national security threats are dealt with
considering both an adequate protection of the world
system as a restricted use of armed force for securing such a
goal.

This new reality meant reviewing the original assumptions
over which U.S. national security doctrine was built.

"It may be that America's Manifest Destiny is definable,
but is definitely not 'explicit'. In a sense, each American
has his own definition of the national goal, particularly
that part of it which has to do with an exclusive destiny;
it is very difficult to reach consensus of these ideas
and perspectives" 13/.

Such recognition of the inexistence of a one and only
national interest is consistent with the decrease of the danger
of bipolar confrontation, with the need to preserve the system
as a whole and with the increase in available means for assuring
the attainment of restricted goals.

Starting with this new doctrinal formulation, U.S. strategic
thought shows important modifications. Military elaborations start to be taken as guides for foreign action, as it is possible to appreciate in the field of foreign relations, where defense policies have a clear impact.

"If the cold war changes its character, or even if there were no cold war at all, the U.S. will have a strong and maybe even growing interest in preserving a compatible international climate. This is due to political and economic imperatives, as well as to military considerations. (...) If the present tendencies continue to operate, changing alliances may characterize our world in the 70's as much as bipolarity did the world of the 50's or 60's. (...) It is on this ground that our strategic concepts in making use of ground power and the military aid programme have to reinforce each other. The ability to establish a credible American presence fast—without mobilization—is a key mechanism through which we could help an ally without acquiring an unnoticed long term compromise 14/.

Such a military stand has important consequences, inasmuch as it actually guides the aid to allies. According to such orientations, the South East Asian Treaty is not renewed; the Military Assistance Program loses some of its members—Argentina, Brasil, Chile—without any particular efforts made for making them come back into it; and the need to place a bigger quota of responsibility in the defense of the Atlantic over the shoulders of European allies is proclaimed 15/.

It also guides the distribution of the national budget's allotment of funds to specific projects. In 1979 it meant assignment of funds for the construction of the MX missile system, built on U.S. territory; for constructing the Cruise Missile, which rivals the Soviet Backfire; for development of conventional forces characterized by their flexible use and fast set-up; for the construction of Air Force's F-16, the Navy's F-18, the Galaxy which can transport a fully equipped ground combat unit; and, later on, for creating the intervention units of flexible use located at Miami. All these measures are somehow coincident with the flexible response policy or with the realistic determent one which followed it.
Developments in the field of weapons certainly have an impact on foreign relations and on the possibility of attaining higher levels of determent, since new defensive systems provide a consistent means of assuring the flexible response policy postulates.\(^{16}\)

The new dimension of U.S. national security policy may be clearly perceived when it has to confront situations unknown before, such as the importance which transnational corporations acquire at a world level. Those corporations put forward insoluble problems to a national security doctrine based on national territory. They even alter the bases over which an eventual national interest can be defined.\(^{17}\)

Based on such doctrinal development, the U.S. armed forces have determined new national security goals, which define the limits beyond which a new danger situation exists.

"Maintenance of internal and external security of the U.S., its territories and possessions. This is the most fundamental security interest. (...) Preservation of the security of key countries or regions of the world against the attack of communist states or groups of states...; of a peaceful climate in other selected areas of the globe so they can not become forges of catalytic conflicts conducing to a confrontation of the main powers...;... an access to critical resources...;... the right to aeronautical and maritime traffic through key areas."\(^{18}\)

The present definition of U.S. national security goals means that, eventhough it tends to preserve the world order from final collapse, the U.S. assert the right to intervene any place in the globe its interests are endangered. Thus, the U.S. keeps a permanent tension between military intervention and the maintainance and expansion of the new system of international relations. However, inasmuch as the widening system increases the number of "potencial dangers" to U.S. national security, this doctrine makes warlike danger a ubiquitous reality.\(^{19}\)

In brief, U.S. national security doctrine, though it does not define itself in function of the danger of a total nuclear confrontation, increases the diversity of limited conflict foci,
which in turn inhibits the actual practice of effective disarmament and arms limitation measures, both on nuclear and conventional fields.

**Soviet National Security**

Soviet national security policy has changed according to the evolution of its confrontation with the main capitalist powers as well as with the problems it has met in constructing socialism.

The first stage of the Bolshevik Revolution stressed the need for world revolution.

"Security to them meant the physical survival and the further development of the regime... What was new was the conception that survival and the fulfillment of revolutionary goals depended on similar events occurring in adjacent and other countries, and the conviction that these events would then merge into a single universal movement."

A second stage started with the problems socialist construction encounter in the post-war period, struggles amidst the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the defeat of workers revolutions in Western Europe. Thus, the Sixth Congress of the Comintern (1928) stated that

"...the international proletarian revolution cannot be conceived as a single act taking place everywhere simultaneously. The victory of socialism is therefore possible at first only in a few capitalist countries, or even in one..."

Khrushchev, on his turn, began a third stage characterized by the progressive decrease of international tensions vis-à-vis the U.S., after the resolution of the XXth Congress, which established that

"...since the world socialist camp has become converted to a powerful political, economic, and military force and since the forces of peace have gained worldwide strength,
war is no longer a fatal inevitability. 24/.

Besides, the shifts in the U.S. national security doctrine at the beginning of the 60's, reinforce the XXth Congress guidelines.

Khrushchev's replacement by Brezhnev starts a fourth stage, in which the Soviet Union formulates a national security policy which is characterized by a double aim. On the one hand, Brezhnev keeps to the same definition of the international scene and on the place the USSR has within it as a sieged fortress, and consequently develops a wide research and development plan, both of conventional and strategic value. On the other, it also tries to preserve the already developed international system of the 60's displaying efforts towards disarmament and arms limitation as well as détente.

The present national security policy of the Soviet Union combines elements of the previous two stages. Though it still shows a certain initiative within the field of détente, arms limitation and disarmament, at the same time it vigorously develops an effort at providing its armed forces with the latest technological innovations in the bellic field. For these reasons, an adequate understanding of Soviet national security requires an analysis of both aspects, for they coexist within a single formulation.

A first element of this policy is the assertion of the danger the Soviet Union confronts, product of the military blockade established against it by the developed capitalist countries, both through military installations in their own countries, as through their intervention in USSR bordering countries. Such a definition of the situation has led to the development, first of a conventional capacity, then a strategic one, at inhibiting any attempt of aggression towards its territory, as well as towards the Warsaw Pact countries, and those countries historically neutralized by diplomatic or/and military channels. Seeing itself as a sieged fortress has led the USSR to develop a defense policy which strongly stresses the maintenance of a security belt around its territory. Any alteration within this potential aggression contention zone has brought forth a military response from the Soviet Union. However, the increasing complexity
of international political relations makes external dangers increasingly possible, thereby increasing tensions over the use of Soviet military force over foreign countries.

In this sense, Brezhnev stated at the Communist Parties Congress (1969), that

"The many difficulties the development of these (socialist) countries encounters are closely tied to imperialism's constant aspiration at gravitating over the socialist world in economic, political and ideological (fields)...

For these reasons, the CPSU has considered necessary to maintain a permanent political surveillance over such developments, implementing an efficient propaganda able of convincing of the righteousness of Soviet stands, and maintaining a permanent activity aimed at refuting any form of ideological subversion. Particular importance is given to ideological offensives against the Soviet Union, since

"...in recent years new phenomena have appeared in the capitalist world's strategic and tactical struggle with socialism and communism. Imperialist forces are trying to recover from the defeats suffered in military, economic and political fields resorting to total ideological war. It is within this context that the offensive against world socialism, under pretext of their lack of respect for human rights, is waged.

As stated by the XXV CPSU Congress, the confrontation between capitalist and socialist forms of social organization, by itself generates a high level of tensions in the international field. However, it is not less true that, as far as the internal social order, the USSR does present serious flanks to criticism, not only by capitalist countries defined as actual or potential aggressors. Particularly weak is the Soviet response to the ideological offensive waged against it, which it is not able to meet with the type of answer the own Soviet authorities deem necessary.

Inasmuch as the critique of certain aspects of USSR
socialist constrution are defined as part of the wide spectrum of aggressions against it, the regime makes answering this type of aggression one of its most recurrent topics. Thus, in his speech delivered in ocassion of the 60th anniversay of the October Revolution, Brezhnev stated:

"Socialism can consolidate its positions only if the working people's power is capable of defending the revolution against any attacks by the class enemy (and such attacks, both internal and, most probably, external, are inevitable)" 23/.

Assertion of an inevitable aggression against the USSR, which was left aside by the XXth Congress of the CPSU in 1956 and which reappeared today, shows that, though Soviet rulers do not define today dangers against it the same way as then, they do consider the USSR has to answer to the diversification of aggression against it with the increase of its deterrent capacity, both in terms vis à vis the U.S., as in conventional terms regarding bordering countries 29/.

A second element of Soviet national security policy deals with détente, arms limitation and disarmament. Conclusions of the XXV CPSU Congress, while they consider capitalist-socialist tensions unavoidable, put special emphasis on the need of limiting arms troops in Central Europe, 30/ as well as in stabilizing a peace treaty with U.S. To this latter respect, and during the 60th anniversary of the October Revolution, Brezhnev proclaimed that:

"...the struggle between capitalism and socialism is not resolved in the battle field, but in the realm of peaceful work (...) Détente consists in establishing and recognizing in international documents a sort of behavior code for clean and honest relations among nations, which burst legal and political moral barriers for those given to utopianist adventures 31/.

We find in this an element which was central to the policy of Khrushchev prevailingly favored; that is, the assertion that capitalist countries are susceptible to defeat in the economic field, through the achievement of development goals impossible for them to cope with together with this pacific confrontation
in the economic field, the present day leaders consider absolutely necessary the existence of an equivalent and symmetric international political system. Thus, Brezhnev stated that the USSR did not, nor would it, search to again military superiority over the U.S. 32/.

"Our efforts are directed precisely at preventing any first and second strikes, at preventing nuclear war in general. Our approach to these questions can be formulated as follows: the defense potential of the Soviet Union should be sufficient to prevent anybody from risking to disrupt our peaceful life. Not a course of superiority in armaments, but a course of reducing them, of lessening military confrontation—such is our policy—" 33/.

From what we have seen, it is possible to state that Soviet national security policy combines both world peace initiatives with definitions which locate the USSR within a capitalist siege. This double perspective in confronting foreign relations in the context of an increasingly complex world scene, generates important tensions in the implementation of such policy.

A first type has to do with the growing diversification of the socialist camp. Though the concept of a socialist block could not stand today due to the present disagreements among the different communist parties, whether they be in government or not, the increase in the last decade of socialist regimes or of those which are in good terms with the USSR, shows an actual increase of pro-socialist forces at a world level. That has as a consequence the relative retreat of U.S. political stands held until the end of the 60's.

This objective expansion of the socialist camp has had as a necessary consequence the increasing diversification of the forms of socialist construction and of the policies these countries implement in the international field. Consequently, it is not surprising that the original unanimity within the international communist movement, as expressed by the Comintern's activities, has given way to a greater plurality of perspectives inasmuch as the number of communist countries and organizations increased. This diversification of the socialist camp reflects itself in the problems which non-aligned countries found for coming to an
agreement in Habana, as well as in the prominent absence at the world conference of European Communist Parties lately held in Paris.

The growing richness and heterogeneity of the socialist camp presents the USSR with a whole new set of problems of an ideological nature which it has not been able to meet. To such a challenge it has reacted by reassessing its stand in an orthodox way. When these come from non-socialist forces, they are defined as aggressions. The most important consequence of this type of reaction has been the maintenance of the Soviet trauma as a sieged fortress. To such capitalist blockade the USSR reacts, even to growing ideological internal and external challenges, with responses which in the last analysis tend to militarize international political relations, placing its armed forces as an always available resource.

A second type of tension within Soviet national security policy deals with the access to power of socialist parties in those countries wherein the use of the armed forces does not guarantee their political success. In these situations, as today we find both in peripherical and central countries, USSR military response both in internal and international affairs, actually obstruct the access and maintenance in power of socialist forces in non-border countries. In medium range terms, such a course of action of the USSR military policy conspires against their own aim to become a peaceful influence at world level, as well as it hinders arms limitation and disarmament initiatives at every level, be it regional, global, strategic or conventional.

National Security in Latin America

In the case of Latin America, national security doctrines are part of a properly military ideological complex, differing, therefore, from the U.S. and Soviet case.

As a result of the secular hegemonic crisis Latinamerican societies have suffered, its armed forces have historically played an important political role. Such a political function has required from the armed forces of the continent the development of a corporate thought capable of legitimating its political activity.
National security doctrines in Latin America show an appreciable development at the beginning of the 50's, after the enforcement of the Interamerican Reciprocal Assistance Treaty and the implementation of the Military Assistance Programme 36/.

The origins and specific contents developed in the national security doctrines of the military vary from country to country, due to historical factors as well as to those related to the specific geographic conditions of national settlement 37/. However, common to almost all Latin American military is the initial European doctrinal influence, when the process of army building and first process of professionalization was under way and, later, the ideological influence exerted by the US military through joint activities, education and training programs. The fact is that common doctrinal features do exist among the military of the region contributing to reinforce a viewpoint that facilitates proneness to arms acquisitions, interstate conflict and political involvement.

National security, as an official or semi-official doctrine, is said to be aimed at guaranteeing the state's existence and expansion 38/. For the state to survive as such, it requires permanent development and expansion. The material guarantee of this process is the permanent increment of national power, which is conceived of as embracing almost all spheres of national life. Thus, national security should be seen as a system designed for the increasing of national power. Insofar as the military are professionals in security affairs, they should control the process headed toward increasing national power.

It's clear enough that such a totalizing concept is of considerable use for legitimating authoritarian military rightist governments. The emergence of this type of governments in alliance with national-international financial capital is not the purpose of our analysis. We just want to remark that this conception operates in the sense of overemphasizing the need of military political preparedness.

In underdeveloped, dependent countries in Latin America, that can hardly control even their own development processes,
national security doctrine seems to over-stress the importance of defense institutions and its needs. Such is the common feature of the several social functions of this conception, which are the protection of frontiers; "protecting" society from internal dissent through the elimination of all political positions which search for changes in the statu-quo; and increasing warlike power. National security doctrine operates under the form of a system of public policies heading towards the reinforcement of military power, in the perspective of setting back or performing external aggression; the elimination of internal dis-sesion both through wide state activity in the field of mass-media and direct political repression; the promotion of "social unity" to fight ideological aggression, and the obtainment of economic resources that may provide funds required in case of a warlike emergency.

National security doctrines also have an impact over the region's interstate relations. As military governments make use of them as internal legitimation devices, their implications for foreign affairs enhance fundamental values in a chauvinist fashion. The situation is further complicated when, to historical territory disputes, are added those conflicts between states over gaining control of geo-economic areas which are of importance for their development process. Such a situation implies an increase in tensions and the following pressures over military expenditure, the arms race dynamics and the eventual development of a nuclear power at subregional level.

Frontier problems entail historical importance, since they have been the main causes of wars in the region. Greater complexity is also derived from potential conflict involved in the unfinished process of nation building and potentially disputed areas which have not yet been economically integrated. This accounts for an unstable equilibrium which requires constant balancing.

Controlling the enormous hydroelectric resources contained in the Cuenca del Plata zone is the problem confronting Argentina and Brazil, and involving Paraguay. Both Buenos Aires and Sao Paulo's future industrial development largely depend on the exploitation of energetic resources lying in the zone. The furtherance of such type of dispute exerts pressure over both countries military expenditure and purchases which are historically
the greatest of the region.

Other major area of dispute has been that down south in the Beagle canal confronting Chile and Argentina. Dispute over the sovereignty of three islands has extended to the wider issue of sea jurisdiction. Recent Argentinian refusal to accept the result of Her Majesty's arbitration had both countries on the brink of armed conflict. Though the zone's potential resources are uncertain, the question of Argentinian sovereignty over the Atlantic Ocean's entrance down south and its derivations over the Antarctic Continent are said to be of great future geopolitical and geo-economic importance.

The Chilean and Peruvian rivalry, the background of which lies in Peru's loss of rich mineral resources and vast territories a hundred years ago as a result of the Pacific War, is widely permeated by Bolivian claims for a sovereign coast. Since that war, Bolivia has remained as a landlocked country, and has made of such claim a motive for national mobilization.

Ecuadorian military inferiority with respect to Peru is undoubtful. But late purchases of major weapons by Ecuador, mainly aircraft, have transformed this country in a non-contemptible risk for the Peruvian northern border. Peruvian-Ecuadorian conflict dates from the Peruvian occupation of territory of the latter during the 1942 war. The amazonic region in dispute is rich in natural and energetic resources. Ecuadorian persistence in the finding of a solution based on "justice and equity" might keep this conflict alive for a long time.

In brief, the legitimation function of national security doctrines and the internal political role which the armed forces actually play, have as a consequence the increase of regional tensions, of defense expenditure and of arms imports, which obviously conspire against the security of the involved nations.
Conclusions

The description and comparison of contradictions within national security doctrines shows that it is increasingly difficult to envision war as a continuation of politics by other means. Today, as compared to the past century, use of arms in resolving interstate disputes endangers the stability of the international system in which the different nations interact and on which they depend, and, it obstructs the attainment of peace and development goals to which all countries feel entitled.

For such reasons, arms limitation and disarmament are only a part of a whole set of measures which should be adopted for establishing a new international political order. Together with it, and the internal social transformations required for efficiently supporting peace policies, it is necessary to develop, at an international level, both institutional instances and norms for regulating conflict, as the only way of banning the use of armed forces against reason.
NOTES


2/ Such a situation expresses itself at a conceptual level when survival comes to be seen as "the most fundamental task of any state, and hence of the governments of all states. It is also the most basic element in any concept of security". Cfr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt and William G. Hyland, "Soviet Perspectives on Security", Adelphi Papers, No 159, Spring 1979.

Such a definition of the situation has an important impact over policy makers. "Security means absence of danger, or stated positively- the presence of desired values. We can define objective security as the absence of threats to certain values, and subjective security as the absence of fear of threats". Cfr. Gert Krell, "The Development of the Concept of Security", paper submitted to the VII General Conference of the International Peace Research Association (IPRA). Konigstein, FRG., August 1979, page 2 and 3.


This interdependence process comes to its end with the incorporation of China to the UN system and its recent opening up to the world market. On the other hand, sanctions such as applied to South Africa at the political level have not obstructed the development of this country as an important factor within international trade.


"National security concerns arise when vital national values (i.e., core values) are perceived as being threatened by adverse foreign actions or events. What is regarded as 'vital' is a matter of subjective judgement depending on a nation's hierarchy of values", Klaus Knorr, "Economic Interdependence and National Security", in: Klaus Knorr and Frank N. Trager, Economic Issues and National Security. National Education Program, Kansas, 1977; page 8.

Within this context it is stated that "those goals include such farreaching aims as peace, security, the highest life standards, increase of international trade, civil liberties and the expansion of democratic institutions". Mayor Charles M. Fergusson Jr., "Las Fuerzas Militares y los Objetivos Nacionales", Military Review (Latin American edition), October 1955, page 13.


On the same issue: "...the necessary forces would be relatively small and characterized by just those features that the United States - unlike the Soviet Union - has already emphasized in its military planning: flexibility, sustainability, and the ability to operate in hostile environments far from the homeland". Barry M. Blechman, et.al., "Toward a New Consensus in U.S. Defense Policy", in: Henry Owen and Charles L. Schultz (eds.), Setting


19/ Such ubiquity becomes explicit when it is stated that "until there is not a world community, there would not be an agreement as to what is legitimate or illegitimate in international affairs". Captain Richard T. Ackley (US.Navy), "La Intervención contra la no intervención", Military Review, November 1971, page 83.

20/ In this case we prefer the term national security policy to national security doctrine due to the type of reasoning on which the official discourse of the Soviet Union on the subject is built.

21/ For these reasons it is incorrect to sustain the inmutability of the Soviet foreign policy orientations on grounds of its historical geopolitical aspirations. An example of such a position is the one which insists in seeing the Soviet Union in a permanent search of warm seas. Cfr. "Soviet Global Strategy", The NATO Review, № 5, October 1977, reprinted


24/ SIPRI, *op. cit.*, page 38.


29/ "The safety of the homeland was the principal consideration (in the first stage of the soviet national security policy); the inviolability of Soviet predominance in Eastern Europe was a close second; 'friendly' powers elsewhere on the Soviet periphery were the next; and the entitlement to a role at least equal to the U.S. elsewhere came last(...) For the USSR, power -specially its military component- has long been considered the principal means of assuring survival and the creation of conditions in which the regime can pursue its domestic and other aims", Sonnenfeldt and Hyland, *op. cit.*, pages 16 and 2.
30/ "...the Programme calls for launching 'new efforts to activate negotiations on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. Following agreement on the first concrete steps in this direction (to) continue to deepen the military détente in the region'." Dmitry Proetkor, "Military Détente: Primary Task", International Affairs, June 1976, reprinted in: Survival, November-December 1976, page 264.


This part of our analysis was previously developed in: Augusto Varas, Carlos Portales y Felipe Aguero, "The National and International Dynamic of South American Armamentism", *Current Research on Peace and Violence*, 1 - 1980.

A systematic review of military national security doctrines may be found in: José Alfredo Gurgel, *Seguranca e Democracia*. Livraria José Olimpo Editora, Río de Janeiro, 1975. Gral. de División, Rafael Rodríguez Palacios, "Seguridad Nacional en el Ecuador", *Revista de las Fuerzas Armadas*, mayo 1978; Gral. de Bri-
