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STATE CRISIS, ARMS RACE AND DISARMAMENT IN LATIN AMERICA */

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INTRODUCTION

In spite of recent analyses of the causes and effects of the arms race and disarmament policies in Latin America, an integrated analysis, able to relate the causes of the arms race to an explanation of Latin American disarmament policies and a general framework for disarmament action, is still lacking.

In an attempt to develop a more integrated approach, we will first analyze the main aspects of the Latin American arms race, in order to convey an image of the real dimension of this problem, as well as the urgent solutions it requires.

Secondly, we will examine the disarmament policies of Latin American governments in order to evaluate whether they are trying to stop the arms race in the region. Government action toward disarmament and arms limitations proposals and agreements will serve as policy indicators.

Third, as a result of a negative evaluation of governmental disarmament policies, a general and theoretical explanation will be developed. The main point within this explanation is that Latin American governments have been unable to stop the arms race in the region, due to a generalized crisis of the state in these countries. This crisis is manifest in the increasing autonomy of Latin American military establishments. The military define their institutional means and ends by themselves; hence, disarmament policies oriented by the state face important obstacles.

Fourth, a description of possible disarmament policies, which are not directed by the state, will follow.

Finally, we will proceed to summarize the main conclusions of this analysis.

The main aim of this article is to relate the arms race phenomenon with the theoretical reasons which explain the limitation of governmental disarmament approaches, as well as to examine the effects of this relationship on peace research and action.
I. THE ARMS RACE IN LATIN AMERICA

During the last decade the arms race in Latin America has been speedier than in the early post-World War II years. Latin American military expenditures have risen to more than five billion dollars in 1978; arms imports have grown at a rate of 11% between 1972 and 1977; modern military technology has been transferred from developed countries, however, technological development has not resulted in savings of human resources, and military personnel has been increased 1/.

Relevant conclusions may be drawn from the comparison of some important indicators of Latin American economic growth during the last decade, and those of militarization.

Between 1964 and 1975, the Latin American GDP has increased at an average yearly rate of 5.8 per cent (see table 1), while military expenditures have increased at a still higher rate (6.7 per cent). This evolution has several implications.

The Latin American economies have been becoming an increasingly weak base, in relative terms, from which to support the expansion of military expenditures. Public funds have been assigned to the military regardless of particular local economic conditions, and the military have defined their institutional orientation and developed their programs according

to institutional requirements of their own.

Arms imports in the same period have increased at a higher rate (22 per cent) than the external debt (16 per cent). Not only have military expenditures increased regardless of Latin American economic growth, but arms imports have been made at the expense of a mounting external debt. This has several effects on the dynamics of the arms race. The power of weapon suppliers to maintain and even increase arms transfers to Latin American countries has grown significantly. In as much the United States, Great Britain, France, the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy, among others, are the main international money lenders, individually or collectively through the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and others, as well as the principal suppliers of arms and equipment, they can either provide credit for arms purchases or put pressure on Latin American governments to increase their arms transfers from developed countries 1/. Latin America has increased its military arsenal at the expense of its own economic development by means of an increasing external indebtedness.

Military expenditures in Latin America are often made at the expense of social expenditures, particularly health and education. Military budgets are increased by means of a decrease of public funds devoted to social ends, rather than a drop in domestic consumption 2/.

"The social costs of this process have been very high. While growth rates did not create wealth for the poor, plummeting growth rates after 1974 caused by worldwide economic recession did hit the poor particularly hard. The poor have been obliged to bear the burden of economic adjustment through lower wages, high prices for basic


**TABLE 1**

INDICATORS OF ECONOMIC GROWTH AND MILITARIZATION: LATIN AMERICA
1964-1975
(million US$)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Gross Domestic Product a/</th>
<th>Military Expenditures b/</th>
<th>Arms Imports b/</th>
<th>External Debt c/</th>
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<td>122,147,1</td>
<td>2,376,1</td>
<td>86,0</td>
<td>11,277,0</td>
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<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>227,498,3</td>
<td>4,853,0</td>
<td>767,0</td>
<td>58,062,0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Average yearly rate of increase</td>
<td>5.8 %</td>
<td>6.7 %</td>
<td>22 %</td>
<td>16.0 %</td>
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Sources:  


necessities, fewer social benefits and drastically re-
reduced public services" 1/.

There is a close relationship between the arms race in
Latin America and human-rights related problems. In addition
to the direct effect of the arms race on social and economic
erights, there is another dimension of human rights—the right
to peace—concerned with the arms race. Not only are human
rights violated by the social cost of the arms race, but also
by the increasing danger of warfare between neighboring countries,
due to the military escalade for arms 2/.

The negative effects of military expenditures on economic
development and human rights pose important problems to most
Latin American countries.

1/ Center for International Policy, "The Links Between Human

2/ For link between peace, the arms race and human rights,
Norges Offentlige Utredninger, NOU 1977:23; and "Human
Rights and Peace. The relation between the two, and
proposals for harmonization", paper presented to the
International Conference on Peace and Human Rights. Oslo,
December 1978. For a synthesis of present human rights
agreements in Latin America, see : Héctor Gross Espiell,
"Los derechos humanos y el derecho internacional, 1968–
1977", Jurídica, Julio 1978. For an interesting analysis
of the relationship between human rights, peace and
development, see : Stephen Marks, "Development and Human
is developed in : Study Group on Militarization of the
International Peace Research Association, "The Impact
of Militarization on Development and Human Rights",
Why is it then that Latin American governments are unable to enforce effective arms limitation and disarmament measures in order to overcome the negative consequences of the arms race?

II. DISARMAMENT PROPOSALS AND AGREEMENTS

Before World War II Latin American governments set up different arms limitation proposals and agreements. At the beginning of this century, in 1902, Argentina, Brazil and Chile signed a disarmament agreement, the so-called "Pactos de Mayo". The enforcement of this treaty compelled Argentina to sell back to Japan, and Chile to England some ships previously ordered.

Later on, in 1923, Latin American Ministries of Foreign Affairs agreed on a declaration to prevent armed conflict between Latin American nations. A similar declaration was signed by all Latin American countries in 1933 and in 1936. The "Conference on Peace Consolidation" adopted a recommendation which urged to limit the arms race in the region.

After World War II, through the "Interamerican Reciprocal Assistance Treaty" (1947) and the "Bogota Pact" (1948), Latin American governments pledged not to use force in interamerican relations, whenever a peaceful solution to conflict was available, and set up a continental assistance plan to aid individual countries in the case of an armed attack.

More recently, Latin American governments have participated in different global or regional - both nuclear and conventional - arms limitation proposals and agreements.

1/ This analysis does not include Cuba, because of this country's peculiar strategic and political position vis-a-vis the U.S. which demands defensive measures in order to deter another invasion attempt.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>General and complete disarmament</th>
<th>Cessation of nuclear weapons tests</th>
<th>Non-proliferation of nuclear weapons</th>
<th>Nuclear weapon free zones</th>
<th>Preventing arms race in the sea bed</th>
<th>Preventing arms race in the outer space</th>
<th>Chemical and biological weapons</th>
<th>Environmental warfare</th>
<th>Military budgets</th>
<th>Arms transfers</th>
<th>Declaration of Ayacucho</th>
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A close analysis of the participation of Latin American countries in arms limitations proposals contrasts starkly with the demagogic effects of the arms race for the region. According to the available data, only three Latin American countries can be considered active parties in the field of arms limitation proposals. Brazil and Mexico have participated in the presentation of most of the main proposals at the United Nations and Argentina has supported some of them. The other Latin American countries have been rather distant from disarmament initiatives and have been, at the most, passive elements.

Even active countries have a record of contradictory policies toward disarmament and arms limitation proposals. Such is the case of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela and Peru which have supported general and complete disarmament, even if they are the main forces within the regional arms race.

Most Latin American governments act similarly when they are faced with immediate and realistic disarmament proposals. Such is the case of the ten per cent military budget cut proposal which was solely endorsed by the region's main military power, Brazil. A year later, at the Ayacucho Meeting, representatives of various South American countries agreed on a general declaration about disarmament.

Finally, Mexico has followed a consistent disarmament policy, making proposals of her own, as well as supporting almost all the initiatives of this kind at the United Nations and playing an active role in the implementation of disarmament policies. Despite this record, Mexico has not supported the ten per cent military budget cut and arms transfer limitation proposals. The policies of Latin American governments toward arms limitation and disarmament agreements vary according to their particular strategic interests, as well as those of their military establishments.

Governmental policies vis-a-vis the arms race and disarmament vary from one country to another (see table 3). Argentina's active participation in disarmament and arms limitation proposals is in strong contradiction with her policy toward actual agreements. Argentina has ratified only two of seven major post-war agreements: the "Antarctic Treaty", because of her need to freeze the conflict.
with Chile and Brazil over this area, and the "Outer Space Treaty". Similarly, Brazil, a very active party in making disarmament proposals, has not ratified any nuclear disarmament agreement. Only Mexico has maintained a consistent policy throughout the last decades.

Only three Latin American countries—Panama, Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic—have signed and ratified the "Sea Bed Treaty". Conflict over the problems of maritime jurisdiction have rested support to this treaty.

Brazil, Argentina and Chile have consistently refused to ratify nuclear disarmament agreements. In the case of Argentina and Brazil this is due to actual possibilities of developing nuclear weapons 1/. The Chilean refusal is a sequel to this, for Chile will not ratify these agreements as long as the former two countries do not do so as well, in order to keep open the action of developing nuclear weapons. Chile has, in fact, developed a nuclear research and development program in recent years.

Recent nuclear policies in Peru may be explained in the light of nuclear developments in Argentina, Brazil and Chile. Peru has ratified the main regional denuclearization agreements but, pushed by nuclear development in other Southern Cone countries, has also accepted Argentinian technological and scientific support to develop a nuclear R and D program of her own. Aims to maintain a nuclear equilibrium in the area starting off a minor scale nuclear race.

The same pattern regarding disarmament policies was followed at the Meeting of Experts after the "Ayacucho Summit". Bolivia, Venezuela, Panama, Argentina, Colombia, Chile and Ecuador agreed to

"promote and support the building of a lasting order of international peace and cooperation, and to create the

conditions which will make possible the effective limitation of armaments and an end to their acquisition for offensive purposes, so that all possible resources may be devoted to the economic and social development of every country in Latin America" 1/.

There were two meetings of experts to carry out these purposes. The first, in Lima (Peru) in February 1975, and the second, in Santiago (Chile) in September of the same year. At the second meeting a task force was appointed to develop a proposal for disarmament and arms limitation in the Andean area. A list of the forbidden weapons was set up but it has been impossible to reach an agreement so far 2/.


2/ There was consensus over the prohibition of biological, chemical, toxic and nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, carriers, cruisers and nuclear submarines. There were, however, definite differences between Colombia, Chile and Ecuador, on the one hand, and Bolivia, Peru and Venezuela, on the other, regarding the range of missiles. The former supported prohibition of strategic missiles and the latter wanted to maintain this option free and prohibit 50-kilometer range missiles. Peru was against prohibiting artillery above 105 mm. and Colombia and Chile supported the prohibition of all type of bombers. Cnl. Gerardo Cortés Rencorect, "Los tratados de armamento en América Latina", Seguridad Nacional, Enero-Febrero-Marzo, 1978.

Different positions regarding the list of weapons to be limited or eliminated from Latin American arsenals vary in accordance with the strategic position of these countries and their different warfare hypotheses. As a result of these differences, a third meeting of experts never took place.
### TABLE 3

**DATE OF RATIFICATION OF MAJOR POST-WORLD WAR II AGREEMENTS**

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In sum, government policies toward disarmament and arms limitation proposals and agreements, either global or regional, reflect an increasing gap between proposals and actual disarmament measures. The different government policies on this matter are related with national strategies and specific inter-American political moments and are mostly defined by local military establishments.

The relative failure in implementing disarmament and arms limitation measures is a corollary of the "success" of the regional arms race which has pushed military expenditures to more than five billion dollars in the last year.\footnote{Different approaches to explain the failure of the efforts and instruments of international organizations to control the arms race and produce disarmament have been developed. According to SIPRI, the problem lies in the possibility of individual countries to raise reservations when signing international treaties: "a state may, when signing, ratifying or acceding to a multilateral treaty, formulate a reservation, unless the reservation is prohibited in the treaty, or the treaty provides that only specified reservations, which do not include the reservation in question, may be made, or the reservation is incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty... (In) statements of understanding or interpretation attached to the signatures or ratifications, some states have reserved their positions on a number of important issues. This was the case even under the Treaty of Tlatelolco which has explicitly ruled out reservations" (SIPRI, Arms Control, Op.Cit., page 43). However, the use of the right to raise reservations does not explain why there have so many peace-agreement proposals and why different Latin American countries have worked on having then carried out. This raises the problem of the efficacy of international organizations to create disarmament policies, but does not explain the contradictory policies of Latin American governments towards arms limitation and disarmament proposals and agreements.}

Another explanation of these contradictions suggests that this sort of agreement may act as an element which limits national self-determination. Disarmament agreements may compel a country to act in a given may, and thus violate national sovereignty.
III. THE CRISIS OF THE STATE AND THE ARMS RACE

The principal causes of the arms race in the region also throw a light on the nature of the contradiction between disarmament policy formulation and implementation. An examination of these causes will also allow for the development of realistic and effective arms control policies.

The arms race in Latin America is a result of both national and international factors. The breakdown of the Hemispheric security system—the "Interamerican Reciprocal Assistance Treaty" led by the U.S.—erased common military objectives from the horizon of Latin America's armed forces. The lack of mutual ties among the Latin American military explains, in part, the reappearance of old rivalries and frontier disputes.

Thus, Ecuador has requested a revision of the Peace Treaty of 1942 which gave Peru control over an important part of her Amazonian territory; Bolivia and Peru are pressing Chile for a solution of Bolivia's problem of a lack of outlet to the sea;

Moreover, disarmament control procedures may be perceived as additional "dangers". For an analysis of the contradictions between equal rights and the sovereign equality of states, see: Niall Mac Dermo, "Violations of Human Rights as Threats to Peace", contribution to the International Conference on Peace and Human Rights. Oslo, December, 1978. However, these limitations abound in contemporary international economic and political relations and do not suffice as explanations of the failure of military international agreements.

That is, Latin America in general, recognizing that there are several differences among different Latin American countries. Common Latin American features, expressed under different local conditions, will be focused upon.
Argentina has not accepted an international verdict on border problems with Chile in the South, and faces difficulties with Brazil due to their common interest in the control of the enormous hydroelectric resources of the Parana basin; and Colombia and Venezuela have a dispute over rich oil areas in the Gulf of Maracaibo.

Within this context, the hegemonic aims of different Latin American countries—namely Brazil in the Amazonic area, Venezuela and Mexico in Central America and the Caribbean; and probably Argentina in the Southern Cone—accelerate the continental arms race.

Increasing competition of weapon producers at the international level put additional pressure on regional arms expenditures. Until the mid-sixties the U.S. quasi-monopoly of arms transfers to Latin America enabled her to control to a certain extent the arms race in the area. This control became increasingly difficult in the seventies, due to a diversification of weapon production in the developed countries, as well as an increasing competition between arms suppliers because of the importance of arms exports within their economies. Moreover, licenses and local production contracts allow for production of conventional weapons in some Latin American countries; these countries in turn, supply others located within their spheres of influence and in some cases even develop programs of their own.

The dynamics of this arms race is also supported by the presence of several military governments. The suppression of democratic control mechanisms over state policies enable military governments to allocate public resources according to their own priorities. This is reinforced by the widespread acceptance, within Latin American armies, of the "national security doctrine". According to this doctrine, armed conflict is unavoidable and each country's sovereignty depends mainly on its own military capability.

All these elements point at the lack of control of Latin American states over their military establishments. Not only are the contradictions over governmental disarmament policies consequent with the predominance of strategic and military criteria over international political factors and "national interest", but this is
true for civilian and democratic governments, as well as military ones.

Latin American governments, both military and civilian, have been unable to stop the arms race and to create the basis for an effective disarmament policy at the regional level. Within the arms race perspective, there is a definite crisis of political structures in most countries of Latin America.

Due to this crisis, Latin American states have been unable to control armamentism.

In most cases, these states do not express any real national project and are relatively isolated from society. Hegemony

1/ Explanations of this process of increasing military autonomy have been attempted before. For instance, it has been suggested that interstate rivalry might explain the arms race because of the "contagion effect". Apart from its tautological bias, this explanation is limited and bound to fail because actual deterrence of external attack also depends on the diplomatic and international support a country receives according to its policy of alliances. Inter-service rivalry does not explain why different military services compete among them. The lack of governmental control over the military also needs an explanation.

2/ "The will to live together is not only the will to lead a joint life. It is also the will to evolve together. That is, essentially, the function, the mission, the objective of a national project". Anouar Abdel-Malek, La Dialectique Social, Editions du Seuil, Paris, 1972. For a general explanation of the crisis of the Latin American state and its impact over regional political life, see Augusto Varas, "Hegemonic Crisis and Military Governments in Latin America", paper presented to the 9th. World Congress of Sociology, Uppsala, August, 1978.
by a given group or class, which might permeate the whole of
society and orient the action of other groups and classes, is
lacking and this has a direct effect on political discourse
and activity. Thus, an absence of a national mobilizing social
force brings about an insufficient development of "national
energies". The ruling political forces have been increasingly
isolated in their aim to press their own corporate interest.
On the other hand, instead of a fluid relationship between the
realization of the interests of a dominant class or class
fraction, and the interests of subordinated or dominated groups,
there is an uninterrupted succession of unstable political
equilibriums, broken only by force to either overthrow or support
a particular government.

In Latin American politics there usually is a confrontation
of several projects which serve the specific interests of
particular groups, without a real and effective concern about
global social evolution. Because of the lack of a national pro-
ject, governments express only a reduced set of interests.
Here in lie the roots of Latin American political instability.

The state in most Latin American countries is unable to
express the "general interests". The projects of particular
groups are presented as national ones, in an attempt to create
a national project from "above". In some cases coercive
policies are used with negative results to force the creation
of a national project. The use of non-coercive means for the
same purpose may also result in a failure.

Presently, several Latin American governments are making
efforts to create a national project. In Ecuador, for instance,
the military are trying to integrate the Indian population
throughout a military service which combines military instruction
with regular education. The Argentinian military government
has taken advantage of border conflicts to create a "national
will" and mobilize the masses. In Peru, the former Revolutionary
Government created a mobilization office which organized support
for the regime. Venezuela's government is concerned about
increasing class polarization and the lack of active and massive
support for its policies. These examples illustrate both the
lack of a national project and government efforts to create one
from above.
The lack of a national project, which may serve as an organizing element of state practice, negatively affects the state apparatus. The growing autonomy within the state apparatus is reflected by the lack of a coherent organic relationship between its different elements and social practice, as well as in the relative independence of each government branch in defining its own means and ends. While the executive is relatively distant from society at large, the military are out of control. The action of the judiciary is increasing the gap between legal practice (interpretation of norms and sentences) and the changing cultural and social values. The legislative has been unable to aggregate and bring together the interests of the majority. Thus, the different elements of the state structure move in a rather erratic way, with no apparent relationship between them. Each defines its own set of requirements.

Also the military define institutional goals and obtain organizational means autonomously, regardless of the requirements of the state as a whole or society at large; there is a complete lack of civilian control over their institutions.

This crisis of the state has brought about an increasing contradiction between national needs and the corporate requirements of different state institutions. As long as the military themselves define their own institutional means and ends, regardless of other social means and ends, a clash between the interests of the military and those of the rest of society is bound to occur. With other elements of the state apparatus there are similar conflicts; in relation with the issue of the arms race and disarmament, however, the problem of military autonomy is the most relevant.

The allocation of the scarce public resources to the military contrasts bizarrely with the increasingly unsatisfied basic needs of the population. The absence of a national project and of a guideline for institutional development and the allocation of public funds, makes this problem especially acute.

It is the lack of a national project which makes the state unable to allocate resources according to global or societal priorities and to control its own apparatus. Within the perspective of the arms race, this means that the state is unable to control
the military, stop the arms race and effectively ratify disarmament agreements according to a "general interest" in peace.

It is within this framework that military governments become the embodiment of corporate autonomy – regardless of their class orientation – as they try to impose over society their own institutional project 1/. Such regimes only make the contradictions between the state – in this case under military control – and the rest of society more acute.

The crisis of the state, which results from the lack of social hegemony, also determines the state’s patterns of behaviour on the international level, especially those regarding disarmament issues. As long as disarmament proposals and agreements are formulated and implemented through intergovernmental consultations or multilateral international organizations, only unbalanced relations on the international level are possible with these states. A state in crisis lacks the relative power necessary to fulfill and enforce effectively the international agreements it has endorsed. This is true for military, as well as financial, economic and political agreements 2/. It is thus unrealistic to expect balanced international relations with states in crisis.

Thus, a national crisis of hegemony may affect international relations for the state makes commitments without having the power to enforce them. This problem becomes especially serious in the case of the Latin American military governments – paradoxically, an exceptional case of state crisis – for whom disarmament and arms limitation agreements could result in an institutional "suicide".

1/ Military governments, whether "fascist" or not, always express class interests. The realization of class interest by the military results in an even greater autonomy of the military within the state structure.

2/ Chile, for instance, has ratified the "International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights" but has never enforced it, arguing that there were procedural obstacles.
The implementation of actual disarmament and arms limitation measures has thus been relatively ineffective. Most of these proposals are state-oriented, in accordance with the state-to-state links characteristic of multilateral international relations. The structural contradiction which most affects disarmament and arms limitation policies and endeavors, is the clash between the degree of cohesiveness of the state necessary to control military expenditures and the actual inability of the state to enforce these policies.

IV. TOWARD A NON-GOVERNMENTAL DISARMAMENT AND ARMS LIMITATION PROGRAM OF ACTION

The endeavors of international governmental organizations to carry out and implement arms limitation and disarmament agreements are of paramount importance. This is especially true in the case of global treaties or disarmament strategies. However, in Latin America, according to this analysis, these efforts should be coordinated and complemented with a consistent pattern of disarmament-oriented activities organized by people in all countries who aim at stopping the regional arms race.

This perspective was stressed at the United Nations by the Expert-Consultant Group when it called to

"implement participation of the population of all countries in a more active, coherent, and organized way than until today. Different movements and organizations of political, professional, or religious character, can play an important role in this respect, as they have done effectively in the past. Negative consequences of the arms race are affecting all peoples of the world since they are a threat to their existence, and impose over them social and economic pains. The people of the world have an evident right to receive information on military governmental policies and programs and of their consequences." 1/

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1/ Naciones Unidas, Las Consecuencias economicas y sociales de la carrera de armamentos y de los gastos militares. Nueva York, pages 84-5.
Unfortunately the Expert-Consultant Group did not follow up its recommendations 1/, especially relevant because of its acknowledgement of the "national problem" involved in the development of disarmament and arms limitation policies. From the author's point of view, the Group's recommendations are of utmost significance.

Latin American states have to be "transformed" in order to secure the enforcement of intergovernmental agreements. Evidently this would only be possible through structural change which, in the long run could provide suitable channels for the participation of the people. However, the negative effects of the arms race need to be stopped urgently and global, social, economic and political change cannot be awaited. The enforcement of the disarmament and arms limitation agreements should also be the concern of people organized in presently existing international and local non-governmental organizations, and in a future network for regional disarmament.

In order to reach this particular goal of arms limitation and disarmament, an overall program, emphasizing support for non-governmental organizations and activities, should be developed.

1. International coordination

A program of this kind would have an international dimension. It would be important receive support and experience from previously existing international organizations in the field of peace research and action.

In order to further a genuine concern about peace and programs designed to support and assist the development of regional and local peace organizations, it would be necessary to:

1/ For a coherent human rights perspective, see Asbjørn Eide, *Human Rights in the World Society*, "for human rights to become a reality, states must adapt not only their legal, but also their political and economic system to the requirements of rights. This adaptation must be achieved primarily through the efforts of people concerned". Page 37.
coordinate international, non-governmental programs about peace research and action;

(b) develop specific regional assistance programs to transfer experiences in these fields and fulfill information and documentation requirements.

Within this general framework, it is important to break down the abstract category of Third World militarism and develop regional approached. The same is true for military problems in developed countries.

A global perspective can only be developed from accurate regional diagnoses. A similar approach should be used for regional studies: from a clear diagnosis of the national aspects of the arms race, regional perspectives could be drawn accurately. Needless to say, the regional framework is also necessary to work out local analyses; however, a "grass-roots" perspective should be stressed.

Within this perspective, it will be possible to develop national support programs for a more consistent peace strategy.

2. Peace research

Most peace proposals, such as the recommendations of the United Nations Expert-Consultant Group, IPRA's suggestions to the United Nations General Assembly and the statement issued by IPRA's study group on militarization, stress the need for peace research. Specific research strategies have also been developed 1/. Governmental restrictions on information concerned with military issues lie at the core of this matter. It is important to keep this in mind when starting peace research in countries where there is none, or where adverse political conditions hinder this kind of research. It is also very important to develop a research program guide, in order to facilitate aggregate regional analyses and orient peace research.

The following research topics might be approached:

(a) Causes of the arms race: a study of both national and international factors, pertaining to the arms race in a given country or region, as well as an analysis of the relationship between the two;

(b) Effects of the arms race on economic and social development, as well as on local and regional politics;

(c) Secondary effects of the arms race, that is, problems in some way related to the dynamics of the arms race: cultural aspects, for example 1/.

This peace research program should be organized as a series of follow-up studies, to be updated in accordance with changing conditions.

3. Development of peace proposals

Peace oriented proposals should be isolated from peace research per se. Obviously, research is of great informative and educational relevance, but it is also important to develop alternatives based on this information. There is a close link between comprehending a given situation and knowing how to overcome it. However, the development of alternative courses of action is an autonomous activity and should be carried out at a later stage.

The following are areas wherein alternative courses of action could be developed:

(a) Regional arms limitation policies. The analysis of previous efforts and the identification of the main obstacles to the implementation of disarmament and arms limitation proposals are necessary to develop new arms limitation proposals which

acknowledge the inherent limitations of the "state approach"; a clear understanding of the main political obstacles to this approach, and the ways to overcome them, is very important.

(b) New forms of civilian-military relation. Within the analytical framework of the study, a modification of the nature of military establishments is necessary in order to stop the increasing autonomy of the Latin American military. The development of alternative civilian-military relations should include new forms of participation for the military in the economic and social spheres.

(c) New perspectives on national defense policies. Even if the autonomy of the military is an undesirable phenomenon; to a certain extent, this is a consequence of civilian lack of concern about national defense issues. The development of alternative ways of defense and of a "defensive policy of defense" could be an answer to this problem. These alternative ways could include different forms of recruitment and mass participation in defense efforts 1/.

4. Participation in peace organizations

Peace research and the proposal of alternative forms are

1/ This issue was emphasized by IPRA's study group on militarization. Alternative courses of action were brought up: civilian defense, nondependent modes of national defense, grass-roots-resistance to militarization and to the proliferation of weapons. Cfr. IPRA Study Group on Militarization versus Human Rights and Development, Newsletter, Nr. 1, 1978-1979, pp. 9-12.

In France, "Alternatives non violentes", a grass-roots organization dedicated to resisting the proliferation of weapons, is an interesting example of the kind of organization we advance.

The development of general or "Third World National defense alternatives" would be of small avail, since there are considerable political and military differences between one region and another.
to no avail unless they are consistently and systematically supported by an increasing number of people. An analysis of different forms of permanent peace action-oriented organizations should consider:

(a) A study of the peace organization building process:

(b) An evaluation of the actual effects of the action of peace organizations on national or regional politics, especially regarding the arms race issue;

(c) An evaluation of whether there is actual or potential massive support for this kind of organization.

It could be difficult to develop both peace research and action-oriented programs in a single local organization. However, efforts to coordinate activities and reciprocal support are important, for action for peace needs scientific support and peace research needs active supporters.

Peace organizations should put pressure on local governments in order to secure the enforcement of disarmament agreements and should play an active role in developing arms limitation policies. A program should be developed to find the most effective ways to put pressure on government officials. Differences between one country and another should be considered as well.

5. Publication of results

In order to coordinate support for peace research and action, massive publication of peace information is most instrumental.

Different levels of publication might be explored:

(a) Scientific analysis could be published in books, journals, pamphlets, newspapers, radio and television broadcasts, and films. This material should reach a really massive audience.

(b) Regular information to update previous studies should be provided. Not only annual information should be available, but periodical updates should be distributed as well.
(c) Educational programs at different levels should also be developed. Each university ought to offer at least one regular course on armamentism and disarmament. Similar efforts should be made at secondary schools; local peace organizations could offer such courses as a regular service. Seminars could be developed to offer regular peace education at institutions interested in peace problems. Finally, a regular—monthly or bi-monthly—peace bulletin of massive circulation should be encouraged in each country.

V. CONCLUDING REMARKS

According to this analysis, Latin America efforts regarding arms limitation and disarmament have failed because of the inability of Latin American governments to control their own military apparatus. Military governments are a dramatic consequence of this problem.

It is therefore necessary to develop new and different approaches to arms limitation and disarmament. State oriented policies have shown their relative ineffectiveness. Nevertheless, they ought to be maintained, developed and coordinated with non-governmental efforts.

Greater emphasis should be put on non-governmental peace research and action-oriented organizations, both on a regional and a national scale, underlining the relevance of a close link between these efforts and those of international organizations devoted to peace enforcement.

Special efforts to create both stable peace-research and action-oriented organizations and to provide public opinion with information about peace problems through regular educational programs and/or publication in the mass media, should be made.